Some things are always under construction.

Theory

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\title{It means the same but still feels like something else: Does affective processing differ in the first and second language?}
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% \begin{abstract}
% Language does not only evoke a notion of its corresponding meaning, but is also charged with emotional and affective content. However, bilinguals often tell that they would not ``feel'' the meaning of words in the second language, although they understand their semantic denotation very well. The present study was designed to test whether semantic and affective processing actually differs in the native and a proficient second language.

% Participants were native speakers of German or French with a high level of proficiency in the second language (i.e., French and German, respectively). To assess automatic activation of valence, they underwent an affective priming procedure, separately with French and German materials. To test for language proficiency, a semantic priming paradigm with a lexical decision task was added (again in French and in German).

% Semantic priming (i.e., shorter latencies for related prime-target pairs) was found in the native language as well as in the second language. However, affective priming (i.e., shorter latencies for valence-congruent prime-target pairs) was only found in the native, but not in the second language. The pattern of priming effects suggests that the automatic activation of valence of words in the second language is relatively weak although words are already well integrated in the semantic network. Probable social causes and consequences of this dissociation are discussed.
% \end{abstract}

\section{Theory}

The current work focuses on emotional aspects of language. Foreign language speakers report that they experience their second language as less emotionally laden than their mother tongue.

There are a lot of anecdotal examples and studies in the literature that claim the same difference in feeling two languages. A brief overview is given below.

\subsection{Empirical findings}

There are many anecdotal examples described in the literatire, testifying that the phenomenon of interest is not a single impression of the curent study's authors. Indeed, several researchers have noticed and described the subjectively experienced difference (see Francis, 1999, Anooshian \& Hertel, 1994, for reviews).
For example Anooshian \& Hertel (1994) cite an example of a woman who grew up in a Spanish-speaking home and learned English after eight years of age. As an adult, she used mostly English at home and at work but she prayed in Spanish because praying in English never ``felt right''. Sechrest et al. (1968) reported that married Filipinos used Tagalog for intimate expression, even though English was habitually spoken at home.

Besides, there are also studys that were designed to demonstrate and thus further investigate this issue, just like the present study. They focused mainly on the difference in processing taboo-words in bilinguals, as taboo-words are rather emotionally chargerd. For example, Gonzalez – Reigosa (1976) measured state anxiety per questionnaire after Spanish-English bilinguals (L1 – Spanish) read aloud lists of neutral Spanish, of taboo English and taboo Spanish words. Subjects reported more state anxiety after saying taboo-words in their mother tongue. The author interprets the finding in terms of highened emotional arousal evoked by taboo-words in L1. However, participants were only Spanish native speakers, i.e. the emotional arousal that the English taboo-words would evoke in English native speakers was not assesed. Besides, questionnaires are a rather indirect measure of emotional experience. Thus, due to the methodical deficits, the Gonzalez' study could be regarded as an evidence only for the fact that the notion of lessend emotionality is common to many researchers.

Another operationalisation of the same idea was implied by Anooshian \& Hertel (1994). They based their research on the idea that emotional words are better recalled, because they are processed more intensively. Thus, they hypothesized that emotional words would be better recalled than neutral words only in the first language of participants, i.e. that in L2, there wouldn't be a difference between emotional and neutral words, because they are equally unemotional, thus to equal extents elaborized during processing. Participants were Spanish-English bilinguals (Half were Spanish and half – English native speaking). They saw half of the words in Spanish, half in English; a half of the words was affectively neutral, and a half was emotional. Their task was to rate each word for ease of pronunciation, implied activity, or emotionality. Then, subjects completed an unexpected free-recall test.
To analyze the results, Anooshian \& Hertel compared the recall rates within each language for the emotional and for the neutral words. According to their expectations, they obtained a significant difference only in the native language of participants. Unfortunately, the authors conduct analysis only within and not between the two languages, ``because it is difficult to interpret native versus second language difference'' (Anooshian \& Hertel, 1994, p. 509). However, the experimental results reveal a confusing difference in the recall rates of neutral words between the two languages. If one would compare the recall rates for neutral words between the two languages, it seems that subjects recalled neutral words in their mother tongue worse than in their second language. If the difference is significant, it would mean that neutral words in the second language are more emotional than neutral words in the first language, when one uses the study's main notion. Or, alternatively, that there were other processes involved, besides words' emotionality, that made up the differences in the whole study.

The latter study was replicated and extended by Aycicegi \& Harris (2004), who compared recall to recognition and included different types of emotion words (positive, negative and neutral items, taboo-words and reprimands). The stimulus presentation modality (visual vs. auditory) was also varied. Participants (42 Turkish-English bilinguals, L1 – Turkish) rated each stimulus word for unpleasantness. Immediately afterwards, a half completed a surprise recall test and a half – a surprise recognition test. Emotionality effects were present, but in both L1 and L2. The authors propose that in the recall and recognition paradigms, the novelty and unusualness of the stimuli were the main factors influencing performance.
Indeed, maybe recall or recognition paradigms are not the best means of assessing the emotional power of words in different languages. For example Eysenck \& Keane (1999) mark that ``there are various strategies that can be used in order to recall or recognize stored information'' (p. 114).

A further investigation on the same idea of greater emotionality of words in L1, but with a quite different methodology, was made by Harris, Aycicegi \& Gleason (2003). Namely, this time a psychophisiological measure, skin conductance measures, was implemented. Participants were again native Turkish speakers with English as a second language. Stimuli were positive, negative and neutral words, taboo words and reprimands (e.g. ``Shame on you!'', ``Go to your room''). They were presented visually (on a computer screen) or auditorially (via the computer loudspeaker).
The best results were found for the auditory condition: both reprimands and taboo words produced greater SCR's in Turkish than in English, being in line with the research hypothesis. The authors propose that ``auditory language may be more closely tied to emotional arousal than visual language'' (p. 565). However the authors note that ``the auditory qualities of the stimulus, such as tone, cadence, accent, and participants' knowledge that the voice is speaking their L1, may be the critical practice in eliciting high autonomic arousal to auditory stimuli in the L1''. Indeed, long auditory reprimands had higher SCR's than short auditory reprimands when presented in Turkish (but not in English). This difference suggests that non-lexical aspects of auditory stimuli may actually have played an important role in the study. The auditory items were recorded by a female native speaker of each language. For most items a neutral tone was employed. For reprimands, a lightly admonishing tone was used, appropriate to the meaning of the reprimand (p. 568). Unfortunately, Harris at al. don't report any pretests on their auditory materials, that would grant for equal quality of the stimuli. It could be, for example, that the native speaker that read aloud the Turkish taboos and reprimands used a more expressive intonation than the native speaker of the English stimuli. Besides, all participants in the study were Turkish native speakers, thus we have no information if the reverse effects would be evident for English natives. Hence, as there is no evidence for comparable emotional strengh of the stimuli in the two languages, the results from the auditory condition could not be interpreted in terms of the hypotheses.

In the visual modality condition, significant SCR-difference between L1 and L2 was obtained only for reprimands, i.e. (surprisingly) not for aversive words such as ``cancer'' and ``war''. The authors suggest that in the context of expletives and sexual terms, the arousing effects of negatively valenced words were reduced. Hence, further investigation is needed to extend the finding about the differential influence of reprimands upon other lexical stimuli. As reprimands ``resemble taboo words in being associated with personal threat but are unambiguously acquired in early childhood'' (p. 564), it is not clear whether the obtained results don't reveal a genuine phenomenon concerning only that specific type of emotional expressions.

In a subsequent study with Spanish-English bilinguals, Harris (2004) found again the same result pattern only for reprimands, but solely for late English learners. None of the other stimulus categories included in the experiment elicit different SCR’s in the two languages. Harris (2004, 2006) draws from these results a conclusion of increased emotional arousal in L2 for late bilinguals (and overall similarity of the emotionality of the two languages for early bilinguals). Again, it is doubtful if such a general conclusion is feasible, as the differences in emotionality were obtained solely for reprimands.
However, the main effect for language (Harris et al., 2003) indicates stronger skin conductance in Turkish than in English. The authors discuss this, pointing that this difference may reflect the greater emotional associations of Turkish words.

In summary, past literature provides good support that lessened emotionality in the second language is a common experience shared by many bilinguals. However, there is still little information about the underlying specific processes. The current work attempts to go further on this issue. Because, in order to draw conclusions about how bilinguals feel in a foreign country, one should find out \emph{what} is different about bilingual's feeling a language. The important question is, which specific, emotion-related processes are involved in feeling a language and tend to be less developed in proficient foreign language speakers. These processes could be thus responsible for the difference bilinguals talk about.

The current study focuses exactly on this point. It attempts to spot the diverging processes that lead to the phenomenon of interest. It seems that two aspects of language processing - \emph{understanding} a language and \emph{feeling} a language, don’t function equally well on proficient bilinguals’ second language. So, what is equal – and what is divergent – in first and second language processing? Why should such a difference in the feeling in the second language occur? Which cognitive processes are responsible for that? These are some questions that the current work tries to provide answers to.

As the current work investigates (a) emotional aspects of (b) second language processing by using (c) paradigms from the cognitive science, there are as a logical consequence at least three separate research fields coming together in this study: emotional aspects, second language processing, and paradigms. We will begin with theories about language processing and specifically about second language processing; then, emotional aspects of language will be discussed; least, the paradigms of cognitive psychology used in this study will be revealed and related to current study's hypothesis.

\subsection{Some models and theories about language processing}

Some psycholinguistic models and theories about (1) processing a language in general and (2) processing a second language, are discussed and related to the current research questions in the following chapter. As will be seen, this line of research could give us some valuable hints for our work, but it regards language as a purely cognitive matter and therefore gives no account for its emotional sides.

\subsubsection{Accessing concepts: theories of language processing}
How do we process a language? It is a lexical system - on the one hand - and a means of accessing mental concepts - on the other hand. Similarly, most researchers agree that at least two levels of processing should be separated – a conceptual and a lexical level (see e.g. French \& Jacquet, 2004, Francis, 1999, Paradis, 1997, for reviews). Words are defined as ``verbal labels … used to refer to concepts''; word meanings are ``the concepts to which words refer'' (Francis, 1999, p. 194). Similarly, Paradis (2000) speaks of words as of shortcuts which activate particular conceptual features. ``The sight of a cat, the sound of a cat, the smell of a cat, or a spoken or written word cat will all activate the relevant portions of the concept {cat} … Language is only one way to access concepts, i.e. non-linguistic mental representations. The conceptual network exists independently of language.'' (Paradis, 2000, p. 22).
How does the same matter look like if one speaks not one but two languages? That means that at a lexical level, there would exist two distinct lexical stores (one for each language)(French \& Jacquet, 2004, Francis, 1999). How about concepts? Does each language access its own conceptual correspondents or do two words of two different languages stand for the same concepts in semantic network? This has been a long debate in psycholinguistic literature. Do the two languages in one single mind of a bilingual refer to two distinct conceptual systems, i.e. is a bilingual uqual to two monolinguals in one body?

This is an interesting question and there are arguments for bith sigths. On the one hand, if e.g. you talk about your grandmother, you will refer to the same person no matter if you use German or Chinese, i.e. you will access the same conceptual representation. On the other hand, if you talk about bread, you will probably imagine a different picture if you hear this word in German or in French. ``Pain'' (French) would be light, long and thin, ``Brot'' (German) - massive and usually darker. But this issue has important implications for the current study. Because, if every language would access its own concepts, it would be a logical consequence that emotions would be also different upon encountering translation equivalents. Or, to return to the bread example, you may love ``pain'' and at the same time hate or be indifferent to ``Brot''.

However, recently, most researchers have come to an agreement of two lexicons and only one conceptual store, for this notion suits best to the findings in bilingual memory research (French \& Jacquet, 2004, Francis, 1999). Or, your grandmother is still your grandmother.

This conclusion may be somewhat dissatisfactory, because it doesn't make different emotionality in two languages self-evident. But, there is another point that could provide better prove for our hypotheses: If there is only one conceptual store, that doesn't nececarrily mean that the two languages access it in the same manner. Related theories and research is discussed below.

\subsubsection{L1, L2 and concepts: Hierarchical models}

\paragraph{Overview of hierarchical models}

A number of hierarchical models have been proposed to specify the connections between the cognitive representations of L1, L2 and concepts (see French \& Jacquet, 2004, for overview). All hierarchical models are based on the idea of a three-store-model (two language stores and one conceptual store). The point that makes the different models out (a) is whether and how L1 and L2 are connected together and (b) whether and how each language is connected to the concepts. (Figure \ref{fig:French})

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[scale=0.4]{French.png}
\caption {Hierarchical models, reviewed by French \& Jacquet (2004)}\label{fig:French}
\end{figure}

The main implication from this line of research for the current work could be, that during early stages of second language learning, bilinguals access the concepts of words in L2 via their lexical links with the first language´(i.e. upon hearing a word in L2, one should translate it ones own langage in order to understand it). As the individual becomes more proficient, direct links from L2 to concepts are acquired (i.e. one needs no longer to go through L1 when one uses a foreign language) (Kroll \& DeGroot, 1997).

Consequently, there are two main models corresponding to a high and a low levell of proficency (Figure \ref{fig:Kroll0102}). For beginning foreign language learners, only words in the first language are linked to concepts (Figure \ref{fig:Kroll01}). Hence, in order to understand a word in the foreign language, one should at first retrieve the corresponding word in the native language. As the individual becomes more proficient, direct links to concepts are acquired. That means, one should no longer rely on translation equivalents in the native language in order to understand words in the second language (Figure \ref{fig:Kroll02}).

\begin{figure}[htp]
\centering
\subfloat[L2-words are associated to their L1 translation equivalents. ]
{
\includegraphics[scale=0.3]{Kroll01.png}\label{fig:Kroll01}
}
{\hskip 3em}
\subfloat[Each language accesses the same shared concepts]
{
\includegraphics[scale=0.3]{Kroll02.png}\label{fig:Kroll02}
}

\caption {Two hierarchical models for low and high level of L2-proficiency}\label{fig:Kroll0102}
\end{figure}


These two models stand for two more or less extreme positions: the first is, that L2 is not at all connected to concepts at early stages of language acquisition. The second is, that purely lexical links between L1 and L2 should not exist and somehow vanish an a high L2-proficiency. However, it comes out to be that these two extreme positions are rarely found empirically in a pure form, but exist rather as tendencies in the mixed results about language processing. That's why Kroll \& Stewart (1994) proposed their Revised Hierarchical Model (Fig. 3).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[scale=0.3]{Kroll.png}
\caption {The revised hierarchical model (adapted by Kroll and Stewart, 1994)}\label{fig:Kroll}
\end{figure}

According to it, both lexical and conceptual links exist in bulingual memory, but their relative strenghts differ. As can be seen on Fig. \ref{fig:Kroll}, there is an asymmetry in this model. L1 is larger than L2 because there are still more words bilinguals know in their first language (usually even at a high level of proficiency). Besides, L1 has stronger connections to concepts than L2. However, L2 is also connected to concepts, but the line is dashed, that means, not so strong connections. Lexical links are also active between the two languages in both directions, but L2 is stronger connected to L1 than reverse. The more proficient an individual becomes, the more direct links from L2 to concets are acquired, i.e. the asymmetry decreases gradually.


\paragraph{Implications of the hierachical models for the current study}

Hierarchical models are designed primarily to account for the structure of bilingual memory. However, Harris et al. (2006) cite the Kroll \& Stewart (1994) model, pointing out that it would be a useful framework for understanding the difference in the emotionality between L1 and L2. Specifically, they argue that ``stronger connections to the conceptual store for L1 than for L2 mean that the stimuli in L1 will elicit a stronger emotional reaction...'' (p.272). On the basis of this interpretation of the model lies the assumption that emotional reactions depend on or are part of the conceptual store. As neither Kroll \& Stewart (1994), nor related works reviewing hierarchical models do explicitly state an exceptional position of emotions or affective contents, it is indeed one way to interpret their model, assuming that its predictions apply both for cognitions and for emotions. Further, Harris et al. mark that ``an implication is that as proficiency in L2 increases, the subjective impression of emotionality for L2 will increase'' (p.272). Thus, cognitive and emotional reactions would behave in an analogue manner, increasing with language proficiency.

In other words, if one wishes to apply hierarchical models to the phenomenon of greater emotionality in the native language, one should assume that emotions and semantic associations behave in the same way. An implication of such an intrapolation would be that the lack of emotionality would be due to the low level of proficiency. Thus, this model couldn't account for the lessened emnotionality reported by proficient bilinguals.

For the current study, we need a model that could make different predictions about conceptual representations and the affective contents of words. The current study's notion is that these two issues diverge: L2-words may posess rich and strong links to concepts - as it is the case in proficient bilinguals - and nonetheless evoke weaker emotional reactions. Or, to cut the long story short, we argue that emotions and cognitions is not one and the same thing.

\subsection{Emotional Aspects of language}

The models and theories discussed above provide relevant knowledge about second language processing. However, past bilingual research concentrated on a rather cognitive view on second language processing, i.e. emotional aspects were not attended to (Harris, 2006). As the current study concentrates on the subjective ``feeling a language'', different approaches shall be reveal below that could explain how emotions are linked to language and why this should not be the case in a second language.

\subsubsection{A context-of-use approach}
Harris et al. (2006) discuss different theories about the mechanisms that could be responsible for the L2's not developing the same emotionality as L1. Overall, almost all theories discussed by Harris (2006) have in common that emotionality of language is gained through experience. There are some slight differences, because some models focus more on memory as the basis of emotion, leading to fewer emotional associations in L2 (Conway \& Haque, 1999, Altarriba, 2000, 2003, 2006), and other stress more on the context in which the language has been learned (Harris, 2006), but taken toghether, all models imply that the reason why bilinguals don't feel the second language so strong is that they haven't practiced it so much in emotional contexts, as they did in their first language.
Indeed, many bilinguals studied their L2 in a classroom setting and have seldom used it for non-formal communication. By contrast, they have experienced their mother tongue in a rich variety of emotional contexts from early childhood on. However, the reverse is also possible - i.e. not only few emotional practice could lead to weaker emotionalization of the second language, but also the lessened emotionality experienced by bilinguals in their L2 could make them feel emotionally distant in the communication situation, i.e. they would be less emotionally involved because they use their L2. A circulus virtuosus is probably operating, in that emotionality of language and emotioanlity of social situations influence each other.

\subsubsection{An information-processing approach}
Another line of research may also give valuable account about the process of linking language and emotions. Bloom (Bloom, 1998, Bloom \& Beckwith 1989) investigates language development and emotional expression in early childhood. Learning words and expressing emotion are seen as two distinct processes that compete for the limited cognitive resources of the young language-learning child. Especially newly-learned words are used primarily in an affective neutral tone; respectively, what children said with emotional expression are either among their most frequent words or were ``old'' words that were easiest for them to recall and say.
This theory regards primarily language production rather than language perception. However, may provides another hint in the discussion of the possible reasons why a language could be less emotional, stressing the importance of cognitive capacities. From an information-processing perspective, second language acquisition is seen as mastering complex cognitive skills by concentrating processing energy on to-be-mastered subtasks, which, once mastered, require relatively little processing capacity, thereby freeing up the system to work on the mastery of other subtasks (McLeod \& McLaughlin, 1990). Practice can lead to improvement in performance as sub-skills become automated or restructured (McLaughlin, 1990, McLeod \& McLaughlin, 1986). However, as pointed out by Favreau \& Segalowitz (1983), being ``fluent'' in a second language means a first-language-like performance only under normal communication conditions, without implying that first- and second-language skills are equal in all aspects and under all conditions. Some aspects of a specific skill may be relatively weaker in one of the languages (Favreau \& Segalowitz, 1983).

Hence, lack of automaticity and cognitive resources may be another possible explanation about bilinguals' experiencing fewer emotions in their L2. It may be, for example, that learning a second language is a too complicated cognitive process that blocks too much ressources. One should remember the word form, pronunciation, meaning ways of use, grammatical particularities etc and it is conceivable that in this difficult situation, the learner is not able to remember the emotional contents corresponding to the words he or she encounters. Another possibility is, that L2, though proficient, still requires more cognitive ressources than l2 for some specific skills, so that less capacites are free for experiencing emotions during second language processing.

\subsubsection{A physiological aproach}
Looking at brain correlates and brain maturation is another approach to the same topic which could also yield some explaanations about the mechanisms that could cause the first language to be experienced as more emotional than subsequent languages. For example, Johnson \& Newport (1989) posited a maturational mechanism, such as a set of genes for easily acquiring language, that would be most strongly expressed in early childhood.
Another speculation can be derived from the neuronal and functional difference between cognition and emotion. LeDoux (1989) postulates that affect and cognition are separate information processing functions mediated by different brain systems. The amygdala is the core of the affective system, whereas cognition ooccurs mainly in the hippocampus. LeDoux (1989) distinguishes these two processes not only in respect of the different brain structures involved, but also on the basis of their computational consequences: ``For example, the computations that determine that a snake is a vertebrate that it is biologically closer to an alligator than to a cow, and that its skin can be used to make belts and shoes, have very different consequences than the computation that determine that a snake is likely to be dangerous. The former, called here cognitive computations, yield information about the stimulus itself and its relationship to other stimuli... The latter, called here affective computations, yield information about the relation of the stimulus to the individual. These often lead directly to motor responses (behavioral, autonomic, and humoral responses) rather than to more elaborate processing of the stimulus and its semantic associations.'' (p.272). This discource is an impessive visualization of the difference between cognitions and emotions. It would imply that in a bilingual, second language processing wouldn't involve the amygdala so strong as first language processing.
One can also speculate on a maturational mechanism involved, because hippocampus matures later in infants, providing that affective (amygdaloid) learning is the major
form of learning in infancy (LeDoux, 1989).

\paragraph {Summary}
The three aproaches discussed above provide three different mechanisms that could be responsible for the bilinguals' experiencing their second language less emotional:

\begin{enumerate}

\item Fewer experience of L2 in emotional contexts
\item Fewer free cognitive capacities in the L2
\item Genuine specific characteristics of language learning during childhood

\end{enumerate}


It is also conceivable that two and even all three factors stated above could be involved to some extent. Leaving the question ``How it happens to be...?'' still open for debate, the current study asks another one: ``What is virtually different?''. In other words, the present study explores the phenomenon itself.

\subsection{The paradigms of current study}
In order to investigate the phenomenon of interest, the present study lended expertise from the cognitive science. There is a growing body of research on the topic of automatic attitude activation. Upon encountering an object, it is automatically evaluated, i.e. it automatically activates positivity or negativity. (Fazio et al., 1986). Valence is often assessed in cognitive research by the affective priming paradigm (Fazio et al, 1989). In an affective priming task, a series of positive or negative target stimuli is presented, which have to be evaluated as quickly as possible as either positive or negative. Each target is immediately preceded by a prime stimulus, which can be positive, negative, or neutral, and which has to be ignored by the participant. Nevertheless, results show that the time to evaluate the target stimuliis mediated by the valence of the primes. If targets are preceded by an evaluatively congruent pruime, response latencies are significantly smaller than on evaluatively incongruent trials. This Effect is based on the automatic processing of the valence of the prime, and is not dependent upon controlled response strategies (Hermans, Bayens \& Eelen, 1989).

Fazio (e.g. Fazio, 2001) postulates that there are strong and weak primes, i.e. some words elicit stronger priming effects on the affective priming task, because they activate stronger evaluation reactions. Maybe, it is exactly valence that fails to be automatically activated in L2. Or, in Fazio's terminology, it would mean, that second language consists solely of weak primes.

Consequently, the current study investigates the affective priming effect in a second language. If the subjective feeling of the second language as less emotional is due to weaker valence activation of words in L2, then affective priming in L2 would show different result pattern, i.e. weaker priming effects or even no priming effects at all.

However, finding no affective priming in a second language makes scientific sense only if participants have achieved a certain level of proficiency. It wouldn't be surprising if one would find that beginners in a second language are not able to automatically access word's valences. Moreover, the current study is addressed to the subjective language feeling of proficient bilinguals.
That's why, in order to ensure that participants are proficient enough, a similar paradigm from the cognitive psychology was chosen, i.e. the semantic priming task (e.g. Neely, 1977). The procedure is quite similar to the affective priming paradigm, but this time participants are required to decide if the target is a word or a nonword. Targets are preceded by semantcally related or unrelated primes. Again, reaction times for the decisions are faster if the target is preceded by related word prime than by an unrelated word prime. This facilitation effect is partly due to automatic processes (Neely, 1977, Favreau \& Segalowitz, 1983). Some bilingual studys found significant affective priming effects in the second language of proficient bilinguals (e.g. de Groot \& Nas, 1991, Frenk \& Pynte, 1987, Kirsner et al, 1984, Schwanenflugel \& Rey, 1986, Tzelgov \& Eben-Ezra, 1992, Williams, 1994). In the current study, the semantic priming task is used as an indication for participant's second language proficiency.


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posted by gargichka @ 12:19 PM